Lezersrecensie
The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy
John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt describe the Israel Lobby as a varied coalition that shapes U.S. foreign policy towards Israel. The focus is on the lobby's influence through lobbying, campaign contributions, media, and think tanks. In their book, they delve into influential individuals, neoconservatives, and the lobby's role in the Iraq War. The authors advocate for a balanced approach by treating Israel as any other state while advocating for a just peace with Palestine and addressing security concerns. It is an insightful book with thorough analysis and compelling evidence on what defines the Israel Lobby and its operations. I highly recommend this book especially given recent events such as the Hamas-Israel conflict of 2023 - it has been quite enlightening to me personally regarding why there is such strong U.S support for Israel.
I took extensive notes while reading which I have categorized below.
The book defines the Israel Lobby as a loose coalition of individuals and organizations that actively work to move U.S. foreign policy in a pro-Israel direction. It emphasizes that the lobby is not a single, unified movement with a central leadership, and it is not a cabal or conspiracy that "controls" U.S. foreign policy. Instead, it is described as a powerful interest group, comprising both Jews and gentiles, whose acknowledged purpose is to press Israel's case within the United States and influence American foreign policy in ways that its members believe will benefit the Jewish state.
The book also highlights that the lobby is not a centralized, hierarchical organization with a defined membership, and it includes organizations whose declared purpose is to encourage the U.S. government and the American public to provide material aid to Israel and to support its government's policies, as well as influential individuals for whom these goals are also a top priority.
Furthermore, the book discusses the lobby's influence on U.S. foreign policy, stating that it has been unintentionally harmful to the United States and Israel alike. It suggests that the lobby's influence has made it difficult for U.S. leaders to pressure Israel, thereby prolonging the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, fueling anti-Americanism throughout the Arab and Islamic world, and undermining American efforts to encourage political reform throughout the Arab and Islamic world.
The lobby works to influence U.S. policy in a variety of ways, much like other interest groups. Some of the ways in which the lobby operates include:
1. Lobbying: The lobby engages in formal lobbying activities, such as direct efforts to persuade elected officials to support policies that are favorable to Israel.
2. Campaign contributions: The lobby provides financial support to political candidates who are seen as supportive of Israel, which can help to sway their policy positions. The Washington Post once estimated that Democratic presidential candidates 'depend on Jewish supporters to supply as much as 60 percent of the money raised from private sources. According to CRP's Steven Weiss, "If you are a candidate and you get the proIsrael label from AIPAC, the money will start coming in from contributors all over the country."
3. Media influence: The lobby works to shape public opinion through media outlets, such as newspapers, television, and radio.
4. Think tanks and academic institutions: The lobby supports think tanks and academic institutions that promote pro-Israel policies and perspectives.
5. Grassroots activism: The lobby mobilizes grassroots support for pro-Israel policies through rallies, demonstrations, and other forms of activism.
Who belongs to the Israel Lobby?
It mentions organizations such as the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), the Zionist Organization of America (ZOA), and the Conference of Presidents as part of the core of the lobby. Additionally, influential individuals who prioritize the lobby's goals are also considered part of the lobby. For example, it mentions Morris Amitay, a former AIPAC director who later served as the organization's treasurer. Additionally, the book refers to Jimmy Carter's statement in February 2007: "I don't see any present prospect that any member of the US Congress, the House or Senate, would say, 'Let's take a balanced position between Israel and the Palestinians and negotiate a peace agreement.'"
Furthermore, the book discusses the influence of Jewish supporters on Democratic presidential candidates, indicating that these candidates depend on Jewish supporters to supply a substantial portion of the money raised from private sources. It also mentions that candidates who are perceived as hostile or indifferent to Israel run the risk of seeing some of these funds go to their opponents.
Neoconservatives
The book suggests that neoconservatives in the Pentagon and the White House relied heavily on Ahmed Chalabi and his fellow exiles for intelligence about Iraq and championed him as Iraq's future leader after Saddam was gone. The CIA and the State Department, on the other hand, considered Chalabi dishonest and unreliable and kept him at arm's length. Chalabi was an Iraqi politician who played a significant role in the lead-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. He was a prominent member of the Iraqi National Congress (INC), an opposition group that sought to overthrow Saddam Hussein's regime. The neoconservatives' hopes that Chalabi would be the "George Washington of Iraq" fared no better than their other prewar forecasts.
Neoconservatives played a significant role in shaping U.S. policy towards Israel. It notes that neoconservatives in the Bush administration, such as Elliott Abrams, helped in efforts to thwart ongoing initiatives and instead backed Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's chosen policy at every turn. The book suggests that this approach was counterproductive and made it difficult for the United States to pressure Israel.
It mentions Paul Wolfowitz, Scooter Libby, and the Princeton historian Bernard Lewis as neoconservatives who played a critical role in persuading President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney to favor war with Iraq. The book notes that for them, 9/11 was the new context to sell their old view of American foreign policy.
Additionally, the book mentions John Bolton and David Wurmser, both prominent neoconservatives who had close ties to the White House and played a role in shaping U.S. foreign policy towards Israel. It notes that they were outliers in the State Department, which shared Secretary of State Colin Powell's skepticism about the wisdom of going to war with Iraq. However, ultimately he supported going to war.
The US support for Israel in numbers
- Israel became the largest annual recipient of US foreign assistance in 1976, a position it has retained ever since. Support for Israel shifted from loans to direct grants during this period, with the bulk of US aid consisting of military assistance rather than economic or technical support. In recent years, about 75 percent of US assistance has been military aid, with the remainder broken down into various forms of economic aid.
- Israel now receives on average about $3 billion in direct foreign assistance each year, an amount that is roughly one-sixth of America's direct foreign assistance budget and equal to about 2 percent of Israel's GDP. In per capita terms, this level of direct foreign assistance amounts to a direct subsidy of more than $500 per year for each Israeli. By comparison, the number two recipient of American foreign aid, Egypt, receives only $20 per person and impoverished countries such as Pakistan and Haiti receive roughly $5 per person and $27 per person, respectively .
- Because Israel is legally barred from using US economic aid in the Occupied Territories, the actual amount allocated was eventually reduced by a small amount.
- The book notes that US support for Israel imposed additional costs on the United States, such as the Arab oil embargo and production decrease during the October War. The decision to use the "oil weapon" was a direct response to Nixon's decision to provide Israel with $2.2 billion of emergency military assistance during the war, and it ultimately did significant damage to the US economy. The embargo and production decrease cost the United States some $48.5 billion in 1974 alone (equal to roughly $140 billion in 2000 dollars), due to higher petroleum costs and an estimated 2 percent reduction in GDP. The oil crisis also led to serious strains in America's relations with key allies in Europe and Asia.
- The book suggests that the Israel Lobby played an important role in securing US support for Israel, particularly in the form of foreign aid. The document notes that the lobby moved quickly and effectively to neutralize the Bush administration's efforts to end the conflict between Israel and Palestine. Groups in the lobby employed a variety of tactics: open letters, congressional resolutions, op-eds and press releases, and direct meetings between administration officials and the leaders of influential.
- Finally, the book argues that the United States should treat Israel as a normal state and deal with it much as it deals with any other country. In other words, the United States should support Israel's continued existence-just as it supports the existence of France, Thailand, or Mexico-and Washington should be prepared to intervene if Israel's survival were ever threatened.
Why such strong US support for Israel?
The book suggests that the United States provides overwhelming support to Israel for several reasons, including a sense of moral obligation to support the Jewish people, a belief that Israel is a strategic asset in the Middle East, and the influence of the Israel Lobby on U.S. politicians and policymakers. While there is a strong moral case for supporting Israel's existence, the current level of U.S. support and its largely unconditional nature cannot be justified on strategic grounds.
The influence of the Israel Lobby has been a significant factor in shaping U.S. foreign policy towards Israel. The lobby has been remarkably successful in achieving its basic aims, but its influence has been unintentionally harmful to the United States and Israel alike. Washington's reflexive support for Israel has fueled anti-Americanism throughout the Arab and Islamic world and undermined the U.S. image in many other countries as well.
They suggest that the United States should remain committed to supporting Israel's existence and coming to its aid if its survival were in jeopardy, but Americans should do this because they think it is morally appropriate, not because it is vital to their own security .
They suggest that turning a blind eye to Israel's nuclear programs and human rights abuses has made the United States look hypocritical when it criticizes other countries on these grounds, and it has undermined American efforts to encourage political reform throughout the Arab and Islamic world.
Iraq War
The book suggests that the Israel Lobby played an important role in making the case for war with Iraq, which was the first step in a broader campaign of regional transformation. The book notes that prominent Israeli leaders, neoconservatives, and many of the lobby's leaders were eager for the United States to invade Iraq, but the broader American Jewish community was not.
The book also notes that the neoconservatives-most notably Scooter Libby, Paul Wolfowitz, and the Princeton historian Bernard Lewis-played a critical role in persuading the president and vice president to favor war. For them, 9/11 was the new context to sell their old view of American foreign policy. Although Secretary of State Powell ultimately supported the president's decision for war, he believed that it was a bad idea. The rank and file in his department shared his skepticism. There were two key outliers in the State Department, however-John Bolton and David Wurmser, both prominent neoconservatives who had close ties to the White House.
9/11 and Bin Laden
The book notes that the attacks of September 11, 2001, forced Americans to focus considerable attention on the Arab and Islamic world, and especially the Middle East. This was a critical moment for Israel and the lobby. The document suggests that Osama bin Laden's rationale for attacking the United States was partly based on his belief that the U.S. government was unjust, criminal, and tyrannical, and had committed acts that were extremely unjust, hideous, and criminal, whether directly or through its support of the Israeli occupation of Palestine. Bin Laden believed that the United States was directly responsible for those who were killed in Palestine, Lebanon, and Iraq.
The book notes that bin Laden's rationale for attacking the United States does not stand up to careful scrutiny. Although the United States does have important disagreements with each of the regimes in the Middle East-most notably their support for certain terrorist organizations and their apparent interest in acquiring weapons of mass destruction-they are not a dire threat to vital American interests, apart from the U.S. commitment to Israel itself. America's main strategic interest in the Middle East is oil, and protecting access to this commodity mainly depends on preventing any single country from controlling the entire region. This concern could justify going after one of these states if it grew too strong or too aggressive-as the United States did when it expelled Iraq from Kuwait in 1990–91—but it does not justify going after Iran, Iraq, and Syria at the same time.
The book discusses the impact of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States and its implications for Israel and the broader Middle East. It notes that the attacks forced Americans to focus considerable attention on the Arab and Islamic world, particularly the Middle East, which was described as a critical moment for Israel and the Israel lobby.
Furthermore, the book suggests that the September 11 attacks led to a significant shift in U.S. foreign policy, particularly in relation to the Middle East. It highlights the role of key groups within the Israel lobby in encouraging the United States to deploy substantial military forces in the region, as well as their influence in making the case for war with Iraq as part of a broader campaign of regional transformation.
The book mentions that Robert Kagan, a prominent neoconservative, stated in an interview with George Packer that "September 11 is the turning point. Not anything else. This is not what Bush was on September 10."
Israel policy towards Palestine
The book discusses Israel's settlement policies and its conflict with Palestine, suggesting that the United States should treat Israel as a normal state and deal with it much as it deals with any other country. The book argues that the United States should support Israel's continued existence but should be prepared to intervene if Israel's survival were ever threatened. It also suggests that the United States should make it clear that it is against Israel's expansionist settlements policy, including the land-grabbing "security fence," and that it believes this policy is not in America's or Israel's long-term interests.
The book proposes that the United States should abandon the Bush administration's moribund Road Map, which emphasized a timetable for negotiations, and instead lay out America's own vision for what a just peace would entail. In particular, the United States should make it clear that Israel must withdraw from almost all of the territories it occupied in June 1967 in exchange for full peace. The book also suggests that Israel and the Palestinians will have to reach an agreement on the rights of displaced Palestinians to return to the lands they fled in 1948. Allowing this "right" to be exercised in full would threaten Israel's identity and is clearly infeasible. But the basic principle is both an essential issue of justice and an issue on which the Palestinians will not compromise save in the context of a final settlement. To resolve this dilemma, Israel will have to acknowledge a "right" of return-in effect acknowledging that Israel's creation involved the violation of Palestinian rights-and the Palestinians will have to agree to renounce this right in perpetuity in exchange for a level of compensation. The document suggests that the US and the EU could organize and finance a generous program of reconstruction aid to compensate the Palestinians.
Hamas
The book discusses the perception of Hamas as a threat to Israel and the United States. It notes that some Israelis and Americans argue that Israel's security situation is more perilous today than at any time since 1967, citing Islamic groups like Hamas and Hezbollah as dedicated to Israel's destruction and strongly backed by Syria and Iran, thereby creating a potentially lethal threat. However, the book provides two responses to this line of argument. First, it suggests that this view overstates the threat that terrorism poses to Israel, emphasizing that it is a problem but not an existential threat. Second, it argues that this view exaggerates the threat that Iranian weapons of mass destruction pose to Israel.
Recognition Israel
The book discusses the UN partition plan and the recognition of Israel in the context of US foreign policy and strategic imperatives. It highlights President Truman's decision to support the UN partition plan and to recognize Israel, noting that this decision was based not only on strategic imperatives but also on Truman's genuine sympathy for Jewish suffering, a certain religious conviction that permitting Jews to return to their ancient homeland was desirable, and an awareness that recognition was strongly backed by many American Jews and would therefore yield domestic political benefits.
The book also mentions that several of Truman's key advisers, including Secretary of State George Marshall and policy-planning head George Kennan, opposed the decision to support the partition plan and recognize Israel. They believed it would jeopardize US relations with the Arab world and facilitate Soviet penetration of the region. Kennan, in particular, noted that supporting the extreme objectives of political Zionism would be to the detriment of overall US security objectives in the Middle East.
Gaza
The book discusses the situation in Gaza, highlighting Israel's withdrawal from the region in the summer of 2005 while maintaining substantial control over its residents. It notes that Israel controls air, sea, and land access, effectively confining the Palestinians within Gaza and exerting significant influence over their movements. This control has had devastating effects on the Palestinian economy, leading to a situation where the Palestinians are described as "living in a cage."
The book also emphasizes the complexities of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, acknowledging the challenges faced by both Israelis and Palestinians in achieving a just and lasting peace. It underscores the need for a comprehensive approach that addresses the rights and aspirations of both parties, while also recognizing the significant impact of Israeli control over Gaza on the daily lives and economic prospects of the Palestinian population.
The writers argue against the notion that Israel does not purposely target noncombatants. They point out that Israel's willingness to use its superior military power to inflict massive suffering on innocent civilians casts doubt on its repeated claims to a special moral status. They also mention that the IDF targeted civilian areas in Lebanon, and there is little evidence that Hezbollah was using civilians as human shields. While there is also no evidence that it has been official Israeli policy to kill Palestinian civilians, the IDF has often failed to take care to avoid civilian casualties when fighting against groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad.
Oslo Peace Process
The book discusses the standard interpretation of the Clinton administration's failed effort to complete the Oslo peace process. According to this story, Prime Minister Barak offered the Palestinians "almost everything" at Camp David in July 2000. But Arafat, still determined to derail the peace process and eventually destroy Israel, rejected this generous offer and instead launched the Second Intifada in late September 2000. Israel accepted and Arafat rejected an even more generous proposal-the so-called Clinton parameters-put forth by President Clinton on December 23, 2000, providing further evidence that he had no interest in peace. However, the writers argue that this interpretation is not entirely accurate. They suggest that Israel planned to keep control of the Jordan River Valley (roughly 10 percent of the West Bank) for between six and twenty-one years, which meant that the Palestinians would be given immediate control over no more than 81 percent of the West Bank, not 91 percent. The Palestinians had a slightly more expansive definition of what constituted the West Bank than the Israelis did. This difference, which amounted to roughly 5 percent of the territory in question, meant that the Palestinians saw themselves immediately getting 76 percent of the West Bank and, if the Israelis were willing to surrender the Jordan River Valley at some future date, maybe 86 percent. What made this deal especially difficult for the Palestinians to accept was the fact that they had already agreed in the 1993 Oslo Accords to recognize Israeli sovereignty over 78 percent of the original British Mandate. From their perspective, they were now being asked to accept control of only 22 percent of the remaining territory 11
What should be done?
1. Treating Israel as a normal state: The book proposes that the United States should treat Israel as it would any other country, supporting its continued existence while also addressing issues such as Israel's expansionist settlements policy and the land-grabbing "security fence."
2. Supporting a just peace: It recommends that the United States should lay out its own vision for a just peace between Israel and the Palestinians, emphasizing the need for Israel to withdraw from almost all of the territories it occupied in June 1967 in exchange for full peace. Additionally, it suggests addressing the rights of displaced Palestinians to return to the lands they fled in 1948, while acknowledging the need for a level of compensation.
3. Addressing security concerns: The book acknowledges differing perspectives on Israel's security situation, particularly in relation to threats posed by groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, and suggests that the United States should be prepared to intervene if Israel's survival were ever threatened.
I took extensive notes while reading which I have categorized below.
The book defines the Israel Lobby as a loose coalition of individuals and organizations that actively work to move U.S. foreign policy in a pro-Israel direction. It emphasizes that the lobby is not a single, unified movement with a central leadership, and it is not a cabal or conspiracy that "controls" U.S. foreign policy. Instead, it is described as a powerful interest group, comprising both Jews and gentiles, whose acknowledged purpose is to press Israel's case within the United States and influence American foreign policy in ways that its members believe will benefit the Jewish state.
The book also highlights that the lobby is not a centralized, hierarchical organization with a defined membership, and it includes organizations whose declared purpose is to encourage the U.S. government and the American public to provide material aid to Israel and to support its government's policies, as well as influential individuals for whom these goals are also a top priority.
Furthermore, the book discusses the lobby's influence on U.S. foreign policy, stating that it has been unintentionally harmful to the United States and Israel alike. It suggests that the lobby's influence has made it difficult for U.S. leaders to pressure Israel, thereby prolonging the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, fueling anti-Americanism throughout the Arab and Islamic world, and undermining American efforts to encourage political reform throughout the Arab and Islamic world.
The lobby works to influence U.S. policy in a variety of ways, much like other interest groups. Some of the ways in which the lobby operates include:
1. Lobbying: The lobby engages in formal lobbying activities, such as direct efforts to persuade elected officials to support policies that are favorable to Israel.
2. Campaign contributions: The lobby provides financial support to political candidates who are seen as supportive of Israel, which can help to sway their policy positions. The Washington Post once estimated that Democratic presidential candidates 'depend on Jewish supporters to supply as much as 60 percent of the money raised from private sources. According to CRP's Steven Weiss, "If you are a candidate and you get the proIsrael label from AIPAC, the money will start coming in from contributors all over the country."
3. Media influence: The lobby works to shape public opinion through media outlets, such as newspapers, television, and radio.
4. Think tanks and academic institutions: The lobby supports think tanks and academic institutions that promote pro-Israel policies and perspectives.
5. Grassroots activism: The lobby mobilizes grassroots support for pro-Israel policies through rallies, demonstrations, and other forms of activism.
Who belongs to the Israel Lobby?
It mentions organizations such as the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), the Zionist Organization of America (ZOA), and the Conference of Presidents as part of the core of the lobby. Additionally, influential individuals who prioritize the lobby's goals are also considered part of the lobby. For example, it mentions Morris Amitay, a former AIPAC director who later served as the organization's treasurer. Additionally, the book refers to Jimmy Carter's statement in February 2007: "I don't see any present prospect that any member of the US Congress, the House or Senate, would say, 'Let's take a balanced position between Israel and the Palestinians and negotiate a peace agreement.'"
Furthermore, the book discusses the influence of Jewish supporters on Democratic presidential candidates, indicating that these candidates depend on Jewish supporters to supply a substantial portion of the money raised from private sources. It also mentions that candidates who are perceived as hostile or indifferent to Israel run the risk of seeing some of these funds go to their opponents.
Neoconservatives
The book suggests that neoconservatives in the Pentagon and the White House relied heavily on Ahmed Chalabi and his fellow exiles for intelligence about Iraq and championed him as Iraq's future leader after Saddam was gone. The CIA and the State Department, on the other hand, considered Chalabi dishonest and unreliable and kept him at arm's length. Chalabi was an Iraqi politician who played a significant role in the lead-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. He was a prominent member of the Iraqi National Congress (INC), an opposition group that sought to overthrow Saddam Hussein's regime. The neoconservatives' hopes that Chalabi would be the "George Washington of Iraq" fared no better than their other prewar forecasts.
Neoconservatives played a significant role in shaping U.S. policy towards Israel. It notes that neoconservatives in the Bush administration, such as Elliott Abrams, helped in efforts to thwart ongoing initiatives and instead backed Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's chosen policy at every turn. The book suggests that this approach was counterproductive and made it difficult for the United States to pressure Israel.
It mentions Paul Wolfowitz, Scooter Libby, and the Princeton historian Bernard Lewis as neoconservatives who played a critical role in persuading President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney to favor war with Iraq. The book notes that for them, 9/11 was the new context to sell their old view of American foreign policy.
Additionally, the book mentions John Bolton and David Wurmser, both prominent neoconservatives who had close ties to the White House and played a role in shaping U.S. foreign policy towards Israel. It notes that they were outliers in the State Department, which shared Secretary of State Colin Powell's skepticism about the wisdom of going to war with Iraq. However, ultimately he supported going to war.
The US support for Israel in numbers
- Israel became the largest annual recipient of US foreign assistance in 1976, a position it has retained ever since. Support for Israel shifted from loans to direct grants during this period, with the bulk of US aid consisting of military assistance rather than economic or technical support. In recent years, about 75 percent of US assistance has been military aid, with the remainder broken down into various forms of economic aid.
- Israel now receives on average about $3 billion in direct foreign assistance each year, an amount that is roughly one-sixth of America's direct foreign assistance budget and equal to about 2 percent of Israel's GDP. In per capita terms, this level of direct foreign assistance amounts to a direct subsidy of more than $500 per year for each Israeli. By comparison, the number two recipient of American foreign aid, Egypt, receives only $20 per person and impoverished countries such as Pakistan and Haiti receive roughly $5 per person and $27 per person, respectively .
- Because Israel is legally barred from using US economic aid in the Occupied Territories, the actual amount allocated was eventually reduced by a small amount.
- The book notes that US support for Israel imposed additional costs on the United States, such as the Arab oil embargo and production decrease during the October War. The decision to use the "oil weapon" was a direct response to Nixon's decision to provide Israel with $2.2 billion of emergency military assistance during the war, and it ultimately did significant damage to the US economy. The embargo and production decrease cost the United States some $48.5 billion in 1974 alone (equal to roughly $140 billion in 2000 dollars), due to higher petroleum costs and an estimated 2 percent reduction in GDP. The oil crisis also led to serious strains in America's relations with key allies in Europe and Asia.
- The book suggests that the Israel Lobby played an important role in securing US support for Israel, particularly in the form of foreign aid. The document notes that the lobby moved quickly and effectively to neutralize the Bush administration's efforts to end the conflict between Israel and Palestine. Groups in the lobby employed a variety of tactics: open letters, congressional resolutions, op-eds and press releases, and direct meetings between administration officials and the leaders of influential.
- Finally, the book argues that the United States should treat Israel as a normal state and deal with it much as it deals with any other country. In other words, the United States should support Israel's continued existence-just as it supports the existence of France, Thailand, or Mexico-and Washington should be prepared to intervene if Israel's survival were ever threatened.
Why such strong US support for Israel?
The book suggests that the United States provides overwhelming support to Israel for several reasons, including a sense of moral obligation to support the Jewish people, a belief that Israel is a strategic asset in the Middle East, and the influence of the Israel Lobby on U.S. politicians and policymakers. While there is a strong moral case for supporting Israel's existence, the current level of U.S. support and its largely unconditional nature cannot be justified on strategic grounds.
The influence of the Israel Lobby has been a significant factor in shaping U.S. foreign policy towards Israel. The lobby has been remarkably successful in achieving its basic aims, but its influence has been unintentionally harmful to the United States and Israel alike. Washington's reflexive support for Israel has fueled anti-Americanism throughout the Arab and Islamic world and undermined the U.S. image in many other countries as well.
They suggest that the United States should remain committed to supporting Israel's existence and coming to its aid if its survival were in jeopardy, but Americans should do this because they think it is morally appropriate, not because it is vital to their own security .
They suggest that turning a blind eye to Israel's nuclear programs and human rights abuses has made the United States look hypocritical when it criticizes other countries on these grounds, and it has undermined American efforts to encourage political reform throughout the Arab and Islamic world.
Iraq War
The book suggests that the Israel Lobby played an important role in making the case for war with Iraq, which was the first step in a broader campaign of regional transformation. The book notes that prominent Israeli leaders, neoconservatives, and many of the lobby's leaders were eager for the United States to invade Iraq, but the broader American Jewish community was not.
The book also notes that the neoconservatives-most notably Scooter Libby, Paul Wolfowitz, and the Princeton historian Bernard Lewis-played a critical role in persuading the president and vice president to favor war. For them, 9/11 was the new context to sell their old view of American foreign policy. Although Secretary of State Powell ultimately supported the president's decision for war, he believed that it was a bad idea. The rank and file in his department shared his skepticism. There were two key outliers in the State Department, however-John Bolton and David Wurmser, both prominent neoconservatives who had close ties to the White House.
9/11 and Bin Laden
The book notes that the attacks of September 11, 2001, forced Americans to focus considerable attention on the Arab and Islamic world, and especially the Middle East. This was a critical moment for Israel and the lobby. The document suggests that Osama bin Laden's rationale for attacking the United States was partly based on his belief that the U.S. government was unjust, criminal, and tyrannical, and had committed acts that were extremely unjust, hideous, and criminal, whether directly or through its support of the Israeli occupation of Palestine. Bin Laden believed that the United States was directly responsible for those who were killed in Palestine, Lebanon, and Iraq.
The book notes that bin Laden's rationale for attacking the United States does not stand up to careful scrutiny. Although the United States does have important disagreements with each of the regimes in the Middle East-most notably their support for certain terrorist organizations and their apparent interest in acquiring weapons of mass destruction-they are not a dire threat to vital American interests, apart from the U.S. commitment to Israel itself. America's main strategic interest in the Middle East is oil, and protecting access to this commodity mainly depends on preventing any single country from controlling the entire region. This concern could justify going after one of these states if it grew too strong or too aggressive-as the United States did when it expelled Iraq from Kuwait in 1990–91—but it does not justify going after Iran, Iraq, and Syria at the same time.
The book discusses the impact of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States and its implications for Israel and the broader Middle East. It notes that the attacks forced Americans to focus considerable attention on the Arab and Islamic world, particularly the Middle East, which was described as a critical moment for Israel and the Israel lobby.
Furthermore, the book suggests that the September 11 attacks led to a significant shift in U.S. foreign policy, particularly in relation to the Middle East. It highlights the role of key groups within the Israel lobby in encouraging the United States to deploy substantial military forces in the region, as well as their influence in making the case for war with Iraq as part of a broader campaign of regional transformation.
The book mentions that Robert Kagan, a prominent neoconservative, stated in an interview with George Packer that "September 11 is the turning point. Not anything else. This is not what Bush was on September 10."
Israel policy towards Palestine
The book discusses Israel's settlement policies and its conflict with Palestine, suggesting that the United States should treat Israel as a normal state and deal with it much as it deals with any other country. The book argues that the United States should support Israel's continued existence but should be prepared to intervene if Israel's survival were ever threatened. It also suggests that the United States should make it clear that it is against Israel's expansionist settlements policy, including the land-grabbing "security fence," and that it believes this policy is not in America's or Israel's long-term interests.
The book proposes that the United States should abandon the Bush administration's moribund Road Map, which emphasized a timetable for negotiations, and instead lay out America's own vision for what a just peace would entail. In particular, the United States should make it clear that Israel must withdraw from almost all of the territories it occupied in June 1967 in exchange for full peace. The book also suggests that Israel and the Palestinians will have to reach an agreement on the rights of displaced Palestinians to return to the lands they fled in 1948. Allowing this "right" to be exercised in full would threaten Israel's identity and is clearly infeasible. But the basic principle is both an essential issue of justice and an issue on which the Palestinians will not compromise save in the context of a final settlement. To resolve this dilemma, Israel will have to acknowledge a "right" of return-in effect acknowledging that Israel's creation involved the violation of Palestinian rights-and the Palestinians will have to agree to renounce this right in perpetuity in exchange for a level of compensation. The document suggests that the US and the EU could organize and finance a generous program of reconstruction aid to compensate the Palestinians.
Hamas
The book discusses the perception of Hamas as a threat to Israel and the United States. It notes that some Israelis and Americans argue that Israel's security situation is more perilous today than at any time since 1967, citing Islamic groups like Hamas and Hezbollah as dedicated to Israel's destruction and strongly backed by Syria and Iran, thereby creating a potentially lethal threat. However, the book provides two responses to this line of argument. First, it suggests that this view overstates the threat that terrorism poses to Israel, emphasizing that it is a problem but not an existential threat. Second, it argues that this view exaggerates the threat that Iranian weapons of mass destruction pose to Israel.
Recognition Israel
The book discusses the UN partition plan and the recognition of Israel in the context of US foreign policy and strategic imperatives. It highlights President Truman's decision to support the UN partition plan and to recognize Israel, noting that this decision was based not only on strategic imperatives but also on Truman's genuine sympathy for Jewish suffering, a certain religious conviction that permitting Jews to return to their ancient homeland was desirable, and an awareness that recognition was strongly backed by many American Jews and would therefore yield domestic political benefits.
The book also mentions that several of Truman's key advisers, including Secretary of State George Marshall and policy-planning head George Kennan, opposed the decision to support the partition plan and recognize Israel. They believed it would jeopardize US relations with the Arab world and facilitate Soviet penetration of the region. Kennan, in particular, noted that supporting the extreme objectives of political Zionism would be to the detriment of overall US security objectives in the Middle East.
Gaza
The book discusses the situation in Gaza, highlighting Israel's withdrawal from the region in the summer of 2005 while maintaining substantial control over its residents. It notes that Israel controls air, sea, and land access, effectively confining the Palestinians within Gaza and exerting significant influence over their movements. This control has had devastating effects on the Palestinian economy, leading to a situation where the Palestinians are described as "living in a cage."
The book also emphasizes the complexities of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, acknowledging the challenges faced by both Israelis and Palestinians in achieving a just and lasting peace. It underscores the need for a comprehensive approach that addresses the rights and aspirations of both parties, while also recognizing the significant impact of Israeli control over Gaza on the daily lives and economic prospects of the Palestinian population.
The writers argue against the notion that Israel does not purposely target noncombatants. They point out that Israel's willingness to use its superior military power to inflict massive suffering on innocent civilians casts doubt on its repeated claims to a special moral status. They also mention that the IDF targeted civilian areas in Lebanon, and there is little evidence that Hezbollah was using civilians as human shields. While there is also no evidence that it has been official Israeli policy to kill Palestinian civilians, the IDF has often failed to take care to avoid civilian casualties when fighting against groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad.
Oslo Peace Process
The book discusses the standard interpretation of the Clinton administration's failed effort to complete the Oslo peace process. According to this story, Prime Minister Barak offered the Palestinians "almost everything" at Camp David in July 2000. But Arafat, still determined to derail the peace process and eventually destroy Israel, rejected this generous offer and instead launched the Second Intifada in late September 2000. Israel accepted and Arafat rejected an even more generous proposal-the so-called Clinton parameters-put forth by President Clinton on December 23, 2000, providing further evidence that he had no interest in peace. However, the writers argue that this interpretation is not entirely accurate. They suggest that Israel planned to keep control of the Jordan River Valley (roughly 10 percent of the West Bank) for between six and twenty-one years, which meant that the Palestinians would be given immediate control over no more than 81 percent of the West Bank, not 91 percent. The Palestinians had a slightly more expansive definition of what constituted the West Bank than the Israelis did. This difference, which amounted to roughly 5 percent of the territory in question, meant that the Palestinians saw themselves immediately getting 76 percent of the West Bank and, if the Israelis were willing to surrender the Jordan River Valley at some future date, maybe 86 percent. What made this deal especially difficult for the Palestinians to accept was the fact that they had already agreed in the 1993 Oslo Accords to recognize Israeli sovereignty over 78 percent of the original British Mandate. From their perspective, they were now being asked to accept control of only 22 percent of the remaining territory 11
What should be done?
1. Treating Israel as a normal state: The book proposes that the United States should treat Israel as it would any other country, supporting its continued existence while also addressing issues such as Israel's expansionist settlements policy and the land-grabbing "security fence."
2. Supporting a just peace: It recommends that the United States should lay out its own vision for a just peace between Israel and the Palestinians, emphasizing the need for Israel to withdraw from almost all of the territories it occupied in June 1967 in exchange for full peace. Additionally, it suggests addressing the rights of displaced Palestinians to return to the lands they fled in 1948, while acknowledging the need for a level of compensation.
3. Addressing security concerns: The book acknowledges differing perspectives on Israel's security situation, particularly in relation to threats posed by groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, and suggests that the United States should be prepared to intervene if Israel's survival were ever threatened.
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